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Roberts: Criteria for the Award of a Foreign Air Route to a Domestic Air C
CRITERIA FOR THE AWARD OF A FOREIGN AIR
ROUTE TO A DOMESTIC AIR CARRIER*
EDWARD C. ROBERTS**

IV. COMPETITION

A. Tm. STATuTORY CommA.AND
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 requires that the Board in
assessing the public convenience and necessity shall consider,
among other things, the following:
(d) Competition to the extent necessary to assure the
sound development of an air-transportation system properly
adapted to the needs of the foreign and domestic commerce
of the United States, of the Postal Service and of the na-

tional defense; ... 320
Upon examination the unusual nature of this mandate is apparent, for here is a public utility act requiring competition and
speaking in terms of using competition to develop a system of air
transportation, whereas the usual public utility statute seeks to
limit competition and to limit development to a narrowly circumscribed area where the utility has a monopoly.327 The Board
early noted the significance of such language, stating that "this
provision has no counterpart" in the Motor Carrier's Act of 1935
which was the basis for the present regulatory system.328 The
task for the Board in granting certificates of public convenience
and necessity was to avoid the perils of destructive competition,
and, paradoxically, to use competition to produce results that
competition could not produce. 329 In short, what the act required
30
was regulated competition.3
* This is Part II of a two part Article; Part I may be found in 15 S.C.L.Rev.
867.-Ed.
** LL.B. 1962, University of South Carolina; LL.M. 1963, Georgetown University Law Center; partner in the firm of Martin and Roberts, Spartanburg,

S.C.
326. § 102(d); 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(d) (1958).
327. Maclay and Burt, Entry of New Carriersinto Domestic Air Transportation, 22 J.AiRL.&Coma., 133 (1955).
328. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 30
(1940) ; see id. at 34.
329. Alaska Air Transport, Inc., 3 C.A.B. 804, 819 (1942); TWA, NorthSouth California Service, 4 C.A.B. 374-375 (1944); Thomas, Economic Regulation of Scheduled Air Transport, 89 (1951) ; Bluestone, supra note 324, at 42.
330. LisSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT AND NATIONAL PtILIcY at
250 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Lissitzyn] ; Tipton and Gervitz, The Regula-
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With the very first decisions awarding new service in international air transportation under the Act, the Board emphasized
the importance of competitive service. When Pan American
applied for the first trans-Atlantic route from the United States
to Great Britain, the Board refused to grant Pan American all
of the landing rights available under the treaty authorizing
service. The application had to be considered in light of "the
necessity of preserving the possibility of competition," the Board
declared. "If any carrier had the right to utilize the landing
rights to the extent of the full number provided for in international agreements, any competition that might be found necessary to assure the sound development of an air transportation
33
system would be impossible of attainment." 1 Shortly thereafter,

American Export Airlines applied for the second trans-Atlantic
service to Great Britain, which the Board granted as being in
83 2
the public interest.
B.

RATIONALE OF CompETrTIoN I

FormiGN Am Comsmon

The rationale for the decision was most important, for it set
the policy of the Board toward future competing service. In the
first place, the Board reasoned, competition in air transport, as
in other branches of business, could be expected to improve standards of service, lower rates, and provide a general spirit of
initiative and progress. The Board declared: "Benefits to the
public in the shape .of improved service resulting from advances
in the industry, would be accelerated by competition333between
United States carriers on the North Atlantic Route."
Secondly, the Board buttressed its argument by demonstrating
that the imperative necessity for competition lay in the fact that
the Board had no power to regulate the economic aspects of foreign air carriage:
Whereas the Board may enforce the duty imposed on air
carriers by § 401(a) to provide adequate service, equipment,
tion of Competition in the Air Transport Indiutry, 22 J.AmaL.&Comm. 157, 179

(1955).

331. Pan American Airways, Trans-Atlantic Operations, 1 C.A.A. 118, 131

(1939).
332. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16 (1940).
333. Id. at 321; see LISSITZYN at 257; Hale and Hale, Competition of Control
IV: Air Carriers,109 U.AL.L.REv. 311, 314 (1961).
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and facilities in interstate or overseas air transportation, its
power in this respect does not extend to carriers engaged in
foreign air transportation, upon whom the Act imposed no
similar duty. Moreover, the Board's power to regulate rates,
fares, and charges of air carriers does not extend to operations in foreign air transportation. Thus, economic regulations alone may not be relied on to take the place of the
stimulus which competition provides to the advancement of
33 4
technique and service in air transportation.
Moreover, the Board found that the additional service would
provide a "yardstick" by which the efficiency of Pan American's
3 35
service could be measured.
Finally the Board attempted to explain why its decision was
consistent with general principles of utility regulation, and in
so doing it provided a clue as to nature of the traffic requirements for competitive service:
Competition does not necessarily involve a useless duplication of service. It is true that where a territory is served by
a utility which (1) has pioneered in the field, (2) is rendering efficient service, (3) is fulfilling adequately the duty
which, as a public utility, it owes to the public and, (4) the
territory is so generally served that it may be said to have
reached the point of saturation as regards the particular
service which the utility furnishes, the trend today is to
protect the utility within such field. Intervener [Pan American] has pioneered the route under consideration and is
rendering efficient service within the limits of its facilities,
but the saturation point of available air traffic on this route
is not yet reached. The territory to be served through the
33 6
termini of the trans-Atlantic route is almost unlimited.
Thus, the Board seemed to have laid down "the point of saturation," as the test of entry into a foreign air route market. Whether this was to remain the test was another thing altogether 37
334. Id. at 32; see LissiTZYN at 259.

335. American Export Airlines, supra note 332; see LissITzyv at 262, where
it is claimed the mere threat of competition caused an improvement in Pan
American's service.
336. American Export Airlines, supra note 332 at 34.
337. For discussion of the legislative history of the 1938 Act, see Berge, Coinpetition to the Extent Necessary, An Historical Introduction, 22 J. AIRL.&
Comm. 127 (1955) ; see Comment: Merger and Monopoly in Domestic Aviation,
62 CoL.L.REv. 851, 855-59 (1962).
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When the Board refused to grant Pan American the full extent of the treaty landing rights in the first Trans-Atlantic case,
it could not be imagined that the company that had pioneered
the nation's international routes would stand aside quietly. And
in fact Pan American was not gracious enough to give up its
exclusive interest in trans-Atlantic air commerce without a
strenuous fight. Accordingly, in rebuttal to the Board's policy
of competitioA Pan American brought forward the argument
that the United States should be represented by a "chosen instrument," or a single company in matters of foreign air transportation. In terms of statutory language it means that the Board
has an ambit of discretion in certifying competitive service if it
finds that the public can be better served without competition
even though the traffic potential might warrant it.
The argument was first presented in skeletal form in Pan
American's attempt to exclude rival American Export Airlines
from the trans-Atlantic service. The Board rebuffed Pan American, saying, "We are unable to find that continued maintenance
of an exclusive monopoly of trans-Atlantic American flag air
transportation is in the public interest ....

,,33

The proposition

was presented in its fullest development in the postwar cases
dealing with the expansion of American flag service on foreign
routes. There were four arguments:
(1) There will not be sufficient traffic potential to support
more than one domestic air carrier in international aviation.
(2) Economies of large high-speed aircraft can be utilized
only if operations are concentrated in one company.
(3) Separate identities of carriers should be maintained; if
domestic carriers are allowed to enter international air
transportation, Pan American, which has no feeder operations, will be at a serious competitive disadvantage.
(4) The company which pioneers a route should not be required to turn over the benefits of its developmental work
3 39
to strangers.
338. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Services, 2 C.A.B. 16, 34
(1940).
339. These statements summarize the arguments presented by Pan American

in its lengthy postwar dialogue with the Board in the following cases: Northeast
Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319, 324-327; Additional
Service to Latin America Case, 6 C.A.B. 857, 861, 864-65; Pacific Case, 7
C.A.B. 209, 225-226 (1946) ; American Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Atlantic
Routes, 7 C.A.B. 285 (1946); Pan American Airways, Inc. Domestic Routes,

11 C.A.B. 852, 874, 878-883, 885 (1950).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol16/iss2/1

4

1964]

Roberts: Criteria for the Award of a Foreign Air Route to a Domestic Air C
267
Cirr'iaA AWARD - DosTic Am CAmuiE

The Board rejected the proposition point by point, saying:
(1) There is a vast untapped potential for international air
transportation which is sufficient to support competing
service.
(2) A reduction of travel costs to the public will result only
through regulated competition between United States carriers.
(3) Separate identity is not required. Domestics would have
an advantage, were Pan American restricted to entry at the
shore line of the United States; this advantage is minimized
by authorization for Pan American to conduct operations
to major traffic centers of the United States.
(4) Pan American as the established carrier in the field of
international aviation will always retain those intangible
8 40
advantages which accrue to the pioneer.

When one reviews the dialogue between the CAB and Pan
American it is evident that the Board's replies did not entirely
answer the question of authorizing a chosen instrument. It would
seem that the Board had premised its rejection on some strong
underlying belief that a chosen instrument was inimical to the
public interest. If one looks generally to the cases, certain language in them suggests that the fundamental reason for rejection
of the chosen instrument policy was that the Board had a "fear of
power," of the abuses that uncontrolled monopoly brings with
it.341 In fact, in authorizing the first competitive service over
the trans-Atlantic routes, the Board had equated monopoly with
the abuse of the public interest. The Board stated:
We are unable to find that the continued maintenance of an
exclusive monopoly of trans-Atlantic American flag air

transportation is in the public interest, particularly since
there is no such public control over the passenger or express
rates to be charged or over the service to be rendered as is
340. Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319, 322,
325, 327 (1945) ; Additional Service to Latin America Case, 6 C.A.B. 857, 864865, 867, 904 (1946); Pacific Case 7 C.A.B. 209, 226, 227 (1946); American
Overseas Airlines, Inc., South Atlantic Routes, 7 C.A.B. 285 (1946); Pan
American Airways, Inc., 11 C.A.B. 852, 885, 933-34 (1950).
341. Westwood, at 52; see, e.g., Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., Hawaiian Case, 7
C.A.B. 83, 108 (1946); Pan American Airways, Inc., Domestic Routes, 11
C.A.B. 852, 885 (1950); TransPacific Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47,
54-55 (1955); New York-Mexico City Nonstop Service Case, 25 C.A.B. 323,
329 (1957).
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customarily42provided in the case of a publicly protected
monopoly.
In later cases the Board was to reiterate its famous dictum concerning the benefits of competition:
The improvements which flow from a competitive service
34
cannot be decreed by administrative fiat.

3

Thus, the Board set the basic policy that only competition could
guarantee the traveling public the increasing comfort and convenience that the future of air transport promised. An additional
consideration in international aviation was the danger that a
monopoly carrier might meddle in the intergovernmental negotiations for obtaining treaty rights. To allow a chosen instrument to represent the United States exclusively, the Board argued, "would result in placing that company in a position of
power which might enable it to interfere with public policies unacceptable to management."

44

In the next move of the battle of wits between the Board and
Pan American, the carrier submitted its rejoinder. "If improvements which flow from a competitive service cannot be decreed
by administrative fiat," Pan American logically argued, why
cannot the competitive stimulus come from foreign air carriers,
which would soon rapidly multiply as the nations of the world
recovered their energies from the drain of war. 3 45 The Board
dismissed the argument on the ground that "national loyalties"
would prevent foreign air carriers from providing the necessary
competitive stimulus. Research and development of the foreign
carriers would not be readily available to the American carriers.
Consequently, there would not be an adequate "yardstick" by
which the performance of domestic air carriers could be measured. 40 E ven though there might exist a general competitive
342. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 34

(1940).
343. Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319, 326

1945), quoting, Colonial Airlines, Atlantic Seaboard Operations, 4 C.A.B. 522
1944) ; Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 904 (1946). There
is considerable doubt generally as to the efficacy of competition in raising stand-

ards of service and at the same time lowering costs to the traveling public. See

Gill and Bates, Airline Competition passimn (1949) ; Friendly at 1072; Hale and
Hale, supra note 333 at 344; but see Maclay and Burt, mupra note 327, 138-147;

Tipton and Gervitz, supra note 330, 166-167, 180.
344. Northeast Airlines, Inc., North Atlantic Route Case, 6 C.A.B. 319, 326
(1945).
345. Id. at 325; Additional Service to Latin America Case, 6 C.A.B. 857, 861
(1946).
346. Northeast Airlines, Inc., supra note 344 at 325; Lissitzyn at 262.
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stimulus from the foreign carriers, the Board had early thought
that the national system would best benefit from American carrier competition. It declared:
(U)nless and until the U. S. Air carriers can match a given
improvement in the service rendered by a foreign air carrier,
United States air transportation will not have advanced. On
the other hand, any addition to service or improvement of
equipment will be an immediate and direct advantage to
47
the air transportation system of the United States.
Five years after making the foregoing declaration of policy, the
Board had the occasion to demonstrate its accuracy. In making
an award of competitive service on the New York-Bermuda route
in the Latin American Case the Board took care to point to the
low standard of service on the route as an example of the failure
of competition with foreign carriers to produce benefits to the
public. The Board wrote:
These data indicate that the air traffic of the Bermuda route
has not been fully developed by the existing air services.
Such development, we believe can be attained only through
the maintenance of a system of vigorous competitive services
348
provided by a United States air carrier.
Rebuffed at all points, Pan American made an attempt to
equalize its position by seeking domestic routes so that it could
offer single-carrier, single-plane service from the interior of the
United States to foreign points.34 9 In a classic case Pan American
argued that almost all the Board's criteria favored the award.
Pan American could provide direct service; the routes would
integrate; Pan American would be protected from conflicts of
interest. 350 In a masterful report the examiner cut through the
clouded issues presented by Pan American until only one was
left. This was that Pan American should have equal access to
sources of traffic with TWA, American, and Eastern who had
both domestic feeder routes and direct service foreign routes.3 1
The examiner rejected this argument on the ground that it was
347. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 32
(1940).
348. Additional Service to Latin America Case, 6 C.A.B. 857, 888 (1946)
cf. Latin American Freight Case, 16 C.A.B. 107, 112 (1952). This policy has
been expressly repudiated, see "Conclusion," infra.
349. Pan American Airways, Inc., Domestic Route Case, 11 C.A.B. 852
(1950).
350. Id. at 867-68, 870-71, 878-81, 883, 885.
351. Id. at 926.
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premised on Pan American's old chosen instrument concept; the
act did not require perfect equality, he declared. 352 More importantly, to inject Pan American into the domestic market with
its superior identity would expose the domestic carriers with less
extensive foreign routes to the dominance of Pan American. 3 53
Thus, the examiner and the Board which adopted the report
almost without comment "feared the power" of a carrier with an
undue competitive advantage. The routes would not have provided a monopoly, but it seems that the Board may have feared
that they might provide a basis for the abuses of monopolization.
And thus ended for the time being the heated controversy
whether the United States should adopt a chosen instrument to
represent it in international aviation. The Board had decided
in favor of competition. But with the adoption of this policy
the Board's problems in international air transportation had
not been solved, nor had the issues of the controversy been disposed of. In fact, the problems of international aviation had just
begun, and most of the same issues remained to plague the Board
in its route awards.
D. FACTUAL CRITERIA
1. Presumptions
With the rejection of the chosen instrument doctrine and the
Board's corresponding approval of competing service, the question arises: When is competition required? To what extent is it
necessary? Board decisions were highly confusing at first. One
domestic case declared that there was "a strong, although not
conclusive, presumption in favor of competition on any route
which offered sufficient traffic to support competing service
without unreasonable increase of total operating cost." 354 The

impossibility of speaking in terms of a "presumption" was soon
apparent. Charges that the Board would authorize "competition
for competition's sake" were raised. Consequently, the Board
retreated to a position which spoke of considering all the "cir-

cumstances and factors involved."35 6
352. Id. at 933.
353. Id. at 894, 910, 913.
354. TWA, North-South California Service, 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1945). Extensive criticism of the Board's vacillation can be found in Westwood, Choice
of the Air Carrier for New Air Transportation Routes, 16 Gao.WASH.L.REv.
13 [hereinafter cited as Westwood]. See Fulda, op. cit. supra, at § 7.12; Hale
and Hale, supra note 333 at 318.
355. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Boston Service, 4 C.A.B. 686, 690 (1944).
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The international cases reflected the confusion within the
Board. The early cases declared that competition "was not mandatory," but would be authorized according to "the particular
facts which justify or condemn competition in light of the standards of the Act. 13 56 This meant that the "point of saturation"
must not have been reached3s5 and that competition could be
authorized only to assure the sound development of the national
system of air transportation.358 Point-to-point duplication was
no bar per se to additional service as long as there was no "undue" competition. 359 In other words, the competition required
by the act must be economically feasible and beneficial rather
than destructive. Such were the guidelines for the authorization
of competitive service until after the Second World War.
As a result of the rejection of the chosen instrument doctrine
and the various authorizations of competitive service in the decisions, it appeared that the Board might have re-instated the presumption in favor of competition. Interestingly enough, the question was raised by Pan American in the North Atlantic Route
Case of 1947.360 By the previous awards in Europe Pan American
had routes to London-Frankfurt, TWA to Paris and Rome. Urging the presumption theory of competition on the Board, Pan
American sought entry into Paris in competition with TWA.
The Board summarily rejected Pan American's petition on the
ground that the Board's policy of route planning had brought
about the competitive result independent from the Board's policy
of competition. In the course of the decision the Board explained
the true nature of route planning in the following manner:
Competition created by those (earlier) decisions either at
points in Latin America or at points in China and India is
merely the incidental result of the establishment of route
patterns designed to serve the traffic potential of different
areas ....The fact that these route patterns happen in some
cases to converge at certain points .. .is not due to the
need for providing competition at these points but rather
to the need for providing the carriers operating into and
356. American Export Airlines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16, 31
(1940).
357. Id. at 34.
358. Alaska Air Transport Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 804, 819 (1942); TransPacific Route Case, Docket 7723, Order E-16286, December 7, 1960, at 14.
359. Trans-Pacific Route Case, supra note 358, at 9, 46; cf. Trans-World
Airlines, India-Bangkok-Manilla Extension, 24 C.A.B. 287, 288, 302 (1956).
360. North Atlantic Route Case, 7 C.A.B. 455 (1955).
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through such areas logical and convenient terminal points
or gateways to areas beyond. 3 61 [Emphasis added]
2. General Considerations
Today, there is no presumption in international aviation for
competition. With the numerous problems of the industry it can
almost be said that there is a presumption against it. But the
basic test for determining the traffic potential necessary to authorize competing service is even today far from clear. It might
be said that one must determine the "point of saturation" that
was utilized in the first competing service case. In actual practice, resort must be had to the criteria enunciated for single carrier service. 30 2 The "fitness" of each carrier to serve the proposed
market must be compared. Whether a carrier is a "pioneer" with
a superior claim may be important.363 Of especial importance is
the capacity of each carrier. The type of equipment used by the
respective carriers, their "load factors" or minimum amount of
capacity that must be sold to generate a profit, the need for
additional equipment to serve the route-all these factors must
be weighed and compared to determine whether the route will
support an additional carrier profitably. 364
Of critical importance is the type of equipment that will be
employed. In an industry affected by rapid technological change
the capacity of a carrier may be tripled by replacing one DC-6
with a modern jet.3" 5 Hence, the carrier's load factor will be
substantially different should he initiate service with older
equipment and then change to higher capacity modern equipment. When other carriers on the route make the same change,
the problem of overcapacity becomes acute because it generally
takes a number of years for the natural growth in traffic to pro3 66
vide sufficient passengers to match the capacity on ihe route.
It would seem that the Board would have formulated some
policy to handle the natural and expected problems of technological overcapacity. However, from its inception until recently the Board was conspicuously silent in regard to this problem
361. Id. at 456.

362. See Fulda, op. cit. supra, at §§ 7.12, 7.13.
363. See notes 57-95 and accompanying text, Part I, 15 S.C.L.REv. 867, 880-

87 (1963).

364. See Fulda, op. cit. supra, at § 7.15.
365. FAA, Report of the Task Force on National Aviation Goals, Project
Horizon, 120 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Project Horizon] ; Bluestone, at 41.
366. Northwest Airlines, Additional Service to Canada, 2 C.A.B. 627, 647
(1940).
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except for its policy of "optimism." This, of course, could hardly
be considered a direct attack. Thus, it would seem that there is
strong justification for the charge that the Board's failure to
enunciate capacity standards has aggravated the problems of
overcapacity. Only within the past few years has the Board taken
an affirmative step. In ProjectHorizon it proposed that the minimum traffic potential for duplicating competitive service be
enough passengers to provide each carrier one round trip flight
per day with a sufficient load factor to allow economical operations with present-day jet equipment. The staff study of the
North Atlantic routes recommended the same standard, but the
Board has not taken positive action on the proposal. It should be
noted that even this action may not be sufficient to protect the
long range interests of the American carriers, for within ten
years, equipment in present use on international air routes may
be rendered obsolete by the Mach II and Mach III jetliners
which are on the drawing boards today.
3. Substantial Improvement
Even though a route might have the traffic potential to support competing service the Board has indicated on numerous
occasions that the mere additional frequency of flights on a
route is not in itself enough to justify competing service.
What is required by the criteria of public convenience and necessity is that the proposed service provide a substantial improvement over the existing service other than could be accomplished
37 1
by mere additional frequency of flights.
The paucity of cases authorizing competitive service in the
international field makes it difficult to delineate the concept.
Certain guidelines, however, have developed. It has been frequently observed that direct service, i.e., single-carrier, singleplane, or non-stop service, is such substantial improvement as to
justify competitive service.3 72 But where direct service is already
available, it would seem that there must be some other benefit
which would constitute substantial improvement. For example,
in the Trans-Pacific Certificate Renewal Case3 73 Pan American
371. Pan American Airways, Los Angeles-Mexico Operations, 2 C.A.B. 807,
814, 817 (1941); Caribbean-Atlantic Airlines, Inc., Puerto Rico Operations, 3
C.A.B. 717, 722 (1942) ; cf. New York-Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 246 (1956);
but cf. Service to Puerto Rico Case 26 C.A.B. 72, 80 (1957).
372. See eg., Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 883, 884, 891
(1946).
373. 20 C.A.B. 47 (1955).
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requested a great circle route from the West Coast to Japan. At
that time Pan American was certificated over the circuitous central Pacific route to Japan and Northwest Airlines had the privilege of flying the more direct great circle route from the Pacific
Northwest to Japan. The Board refused Pan American's bid for
competitive service over the route on the grounds that allowing
Pan American to fly the route would cause serious diversion of
the revenues of Northwest even though there would be no change
in the points served on the Pan American route. 374Upon analysis this decision, like many others, seems to be explained by familiar criteria for an award. Whenever the Board had wished to
minimize the desirability of duplicating service, it had been able
to base its decision on the ground that a mere saving in time and
mileage would not justify new service.3 75 Moreover, where a carrier with a superior identity in foreign air transportation had
sought to provide the competing service, the Board had denied
the certificate on occasion because of the fear of an undue competitive advantage.

37 6

The use of competing service to raise the quality of existing
service has also been an occasional feature of route awards in
international aviation. Although there has been considerable
debate as to the efficacy of such measures, 377 the Board stated
its belief that competing service does benefit the public. For
example, in 1956 the Board awarded a route to Pan American in
competition with Eastern and the foreign carrier BOAC for the
purpose of improving coach service on the New York-Nassau
route.Y8 Reflecting language used in earlier cases, the Board
said:
Past experience has shown that the inauguration of lower
fares, substantial savings in flight time, greater frequency of
service, and more reliable schedule performance has resulted
in substantial increases in traffic, particularly in vacation
markets. The coach potential to Nassau from the North East
United States is relatively underdeveloped as BOAC has
374. Id. at 59.
375. See notes 193-201 and accompanying text, 15 S.C.L.Rv. 867, 904-05
(1963). For a comprehensive statement of what constitutes a "substantial im-

provement" in terms of competing service, see Pan American Airways, Domestic
Routes, 11 C.A.B. 925-26 (1950) (examiner's report).
376. See notes 343-349 supra and accompanying text.
377. See note 343 supra.
378. Caribbean Area Case, 9 C.A.B. 534, 542-43 (1948).
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provided only two tourist round trip flights per week with
t 9
considerably higher fares than those proposed herein.
Although the Board decreed that foreign competition could
not be relied upon to provide the competitive stimulus necessary
to develop the national system of air transportation, foreign carriers can and do raise problems of competition. At the same time
the Board rejected the chosen instrument doctrine, it was careful
not to foreclose its consideration of detrimental competition by
the foreign carriers. In Additional Service to Latin America
case, on reconsideration, it recognized that there would be "a
multiplicity of service" in the Caribbean area stemming from
the Board's awards and foreign competition.38 0
4. Foreign Competition
The decisions often have recognized that the presence of foreign competition may require certification of a United States
carrier over the same route. The important consideration in each
of the cases granting the domestic carrier's application has been
the need to meet the competition of the foreign carrier or to
strengthen the operations of the domestic carrier who was faced
with diversion from his routes by a foreign carrier. Thus often
the decisions will reflect more strongly the criteria used in the
initial service cases, than in the competitive cases. Factors such
as recapturing traffic (pioneering), route strengthening, and
route integration are more frequently discussed than the problems of traffic potential, and cost of service. For example, TWA
was extended from Ceylon to Manila to connect with an American flag carrier because it had been faced with the undesirable
position of having to deliver 81% of its traffic to foreign carriers.3 8 1 Pan American was granted a great circle route from the
West Coast of the United States to Europe solely on the grounds
of meeting foreign competition.3 8 2 Eastern was permitted to fly
non-stop from New York City to Mexico City to match the service of Air France which had captured a major share of the
domestic passenger traffic.3 83 Pan American's Latin American
379. New York Nassau Case, 24 C.A.B. 245, 247 (1946) ; cf. Service to Puerto Rico Case, 26 C.A.B. 72 (1957).

380. 8 C.A.B. 65, 70 (1947).

381. Trans World Airlines, India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24 C.A.B.

287, 299 (1956).
382. West Coast Europe Case, 25 C.A.B. 180, 183 (1957).

383. New York-Mexico, Nonstop Service Service Case, 25 C.A.B. 323, 327,

353-54 (1957).
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routes were strengthened by the grant of a route between San
Juan and Madrid, which would integrate with its routes
from the South and Mexico City to San Juan.3 4
5. Cost and Diversion
The cost of the competing service must be considered as well as
any improvements in the standards of the service. Here the Board
draws a sharp contrast between initial service and competing
service. In the former cost is said not to be controlling if a public
need can otherwise be shown,38 5 but in the case of competing
service cost may well be the most important consideration of all
in that it bears on the financial well being of the carrier and
the Board's policy of reducing subsidy.38 6 The problem arises in
two cases. The first concerns service which duplicates existing
service; the second involves service which would divert traffic
from the existing service. For example, service may be in operation between points A-B-C. If additional service is to be authorized over points A-B-C, the problem is one of duplication or
point-to-point competition. On the other hand, if the new service is to be inaugurated from point A to C, the problem is
whether that traffic carried between A-C by the presently
certificated carrier will be subjected to diversion by the carrier
who will provide service between A-C. If there is point to point
duplication between B and C, the route is also subject to diversion since the route between A-B-C may depend on traffic from
B-C to support operations over the entire route.
As far as the problems of cost of service are concerned, the
two are treated essentially the same. The real question is to what
extent the Board is willing to intensify competition.38 7 The cases
speak of an "overriding" or "compelling" public interest.
384. San Juan-Madrid Case 25 C.A.B. 407, 410 (1957).
385. Note 154-182 and accompanying text, 15 S.C.L.Rav. 867, 897-902 (1963).

386. See note 178-182 and accompanying text, 15 S.C.L.REv. 867, 901-02

(1963).

387. Westwood, supra note 354 at 215. In one famous incident a member of
the Board was asked whether the Board had a "philosophy" of competition. The
following reply was made:
You know, we keep talking about philosophy. We keep talking about the
philosophy of the Board. Well, the philosophy of the Civil Aeronautics
Board changes from day to day. It depends on who is on the Board as to
what the philosophy is. You cannot say that the Board as a whole has a
fixed philosophy for any fixed period of time because the members come
and go, and they do come and go pretty fast down there.
Hearings on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries Before the Anti-Trust
Sub-committee (Sub-committee No. 5) of the House Committee on the Judiciary 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, pt. 1, at 153 (1956).
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If the Board believes that the traffic potential of a route will
increase with the stimulus of competition, it will certify the competing service. On the other hand, if the statistics on passenger
movement are unreliable, if the applicant is relatively weak as
an air carrier, or if there will be extensive foreign competition,
the Board may deny the application. For example, when American Export sought to enter international aviation in the Caribbean with a Miami-Canal Zone service in competition with Pan
American, the Board found the economic data on traffic potential inconclusive and American Export of inadequate strength.
It rejected American Export's bid with the following language:
Even if allowance be made for a large increase in the traffic
movement between the eastern section of the United States
and the Canal Zone . . . [this] is no justification for a com-

petitive service over the 1,200 miles between Miami and the
Canal Zone.38 8
In the same proceedings, however, the Board was willing to
award to the relatively strong carrier, Eastern, a New OrleansMexico City route, which would by the admission of the Board
divert a substantial amount of traffic that Pan American had
carried via its Brownsville, Texas, gateway. Weighing the benefits to the public of the direct service, they said:
In view of the fact that the extension of Eastern will be
affecting a route of Pan American which is primarily local
in character and will have no material effect on Pan American's long-haul services, we conclude that the overriding
public interest which will be served by the establishment of
single-carrier service by Eastern should be controlling in the
38 9
present instance.
The same balancing of interests test favored establishment of a
New York-San Juan route even though Eastern's Boston-Miami
routes would be harmed. In this case the Board believed that,
"the substantial benefits in the form of improved service to the
traveling public are so great as to be compelling."3 90
388. Additional Service to Latin America, on reconsideration, 8 C.A.B. 65,

68 (1947).
389. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 884 (1946); cf.
Trans World Airlines, Inc. Pan American World Airways, Inc., London-Frankfurt-Rome Service, 20 C.A.B. 441, 444 (1955); Trans World Airlines, IndiaBangkok-Manilla Extension, 24 C.A.B. 287 (1956).

390. Additional Service to Latin America, 6 C.A.B. 857, 891 (1946).
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6. Alternative Criteria
In other cases, where the Board has felt that competitive service should not be authorized, it has frequently cloaked the rationale of its decision in the terminology of other factual criteria. In
the New York-Mexico City Non-Stop Service Case39 1 the Board
adopted the rationale of pioneering and "color of title" to keep
Pan American from competing with Eastern's multi-stop service
via Washington, D. C., and New Orleans. An ostensible reason
is found in the examiner's report which declared that preference
must be given to the carrier which operates via intermediate
stops.30 2 However, an examination of the case indicates that the

result can be justified on traditional grounds. For example, the
Board has often said that additional frequency of service is not
in itself a sufficient requirement for authorization of competing
service.103 In the Alaska Route Modification Case3

94

the Board

refined this policy with the statement that: "In absence of a
showing that the service of one company would be more in the
public interest, the carrier which has been providing more service and generating more traffic should receive the authorization."30 5 If the necessity of a substantial improvement in service
is considered, then it appears that authorization of Pan American would not have met this requirement. Pan American had
argued that it could provide direct service for traffic between
Europe and Mexico City. However, the examiner found (1) Pan
American did not serve enough of the European traffic centers
with a community of interest with Mexico City to support the
service without support from the New York-Mexico portion of
the route and (2) that connecting service would be adequate
because most passengers preferred to stop over in New York
City.3 0 It would seem, therefore, that Pan American's proposal
would not have substantially improved service on the route.
The Board's policy of maintaining "area" or "gateway" competition has also been used to minimize the effects of competition.
The theory of the policy is that individual carriers should be
certified to serve different geographic areas with a minimum of
point-to-point duplication of terminals. Those places which do
receive duplicating service are generally termed "gateways" be391.
392.
393.
394.

25 C.A.B. 323 (1957).
Id. at 331.
Note 370, supra.
17 C.A.B. 943 (1953).

395. Id. at 968.
396. Instant case, 25 C.A.B. at 332.
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cause they are the central traffic centers toward which all local
service flows. The effect of the policy is naturally to insulate
American air carriers from the destructive effects of directly
competing against each other in foreign markets with a relatively
small traffic potential. In the words of the Board, the policy is
designed to preserve "the overall balanced relationship between
the carriers" and to provide for "effective competition in markets
rich enough to support competitive service." 397 In the early days
of international air transport the Board sought to achieve this
objective by drawing up a master plan to guide the post war
route awards, which envisioned the broadest possible application
of zonal separation to minimize direct competitive contacts. For
example, the Pacific routes to Japan were to be served over two
routes, a central route via Hawaii and Wake Island and a northern route over a great circle via Seattle.398 In the Pacific Case
Pan American received the central route, Northwest the northern.
The advantage of the arrangement, according to the Board, was
that "the central Pacific route does not present point-to-point
competition to the northern route";399 however, if the routes
were considered as entities, it was thought "a route from San
Francisco and Los Angeles to Tokyo through Hawaii will afford
real competition to the northerly great-circle route having ter400
minals at Seattle and Chicago."
The Board has also sought to minimize competition through
the means of restrictions 0 1 on the service that a competing carrier can offer. In a recent case the Board authorized competing
service on the New York-Hawaii route, but the new carrier,
Northwest, was not allowed to serve traffic between New York
397. 7 C.A.B. 209 (1946).
398. Id. at 224.
399. Id. at 223.
400. Trans-Pacific Route Case, Docket 7723 et al., Order E-16286, December
7, 1960, at 9. Compare President Truman't letter reversing the B Board in 1950:
My objective is to accomplish a route pattern in which our nation may have
the benefit of competition to the principal traffic points in Europe, and to
avoid a monopoly on the part of either of the United States Carriers.
It is apparent that, as traffic points, London, Paris, Rome, and for the time
being Frankfurt, are the leading European cities. Therefore I desire that
both remaining carriers be authorized to serve each of these points....
This adjustment should result in the fullest accomplishment of the broad
national objectives which, especially at this critical time, should govern the
development of United States air transportation and will provide for vigorous competitive growth by our air lines.
North Atlantic Route Transfer Case, 11 C.A.B. 676, 678-79 (1950).
401. Hale and Hale, Competition of Control IV: Air Carriers,109 U.PA.L.
REv. 311, 323-326 (1961); criticized in, Keyes, National Policy Toward Cornmercial Aviation-Some Basic Problens, 16 J. Am. L. & Comm. 682, 685
(1953); Gelman, The Regulation of Competition in United States Domestic Air
Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 24 J. AIR L. & Comm. 410.
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and California or California and Hawaii.40 2 Similarly, in an

attempt to protect Braniff's only exclusive South American stop,
at Bogota, other carriers were not allowed to provide passenger
service there on their flights in Latin American air service. 40 3
V. MERGERS
A. STATUTORY COMMAM
As part of its duties in "maintaining competition to the extent
necessary," 40 4 the CAB has also been delegated the power to
regulate mergers in the air transport industry.40 5 In contrast to
its other functions, the Board in this field of regulation generally
does not positively authorize new or duplicating service, instead
it assumes the role of the protector of competition in the industry.40 0 The statutory command of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958 is that approval of a proposed merger shall be given unless
the Board finds that consolidations, mergers, and purchases are
inconsistent with the "public interest" of maintaining competition. 40 7 The Board is further charged:

Provided: That the Board shall not approve any consolidation, merger, purchase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control which would result in creating monopoly or
monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize
another carrier not a party to consolidation, merger, pur4 08
chase, lease, operating contract, or acquisition of control.
As construed by the Board, the phrase "which would result in
creating monopoly or monopolies and thereby restrain competi402. Trans-Pacific Route Case, Docket 7723 et al., Order E-16286, December 7,
1960; Order E-17230, April 26, 1961.
403. Pan American Airways, Inc., Latin American Route Amendments, 10
C.A.B. 351, 370 (1949).
404. § 102(d) ; 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302(d) (1958). In most of the merger cases
foreign air routes have been dealt with as a peripheral issue. Accordingly, this
article will attempt only to suggest those general criteria which may be relevant
to mergers where foreign air routes are among the central issues. Comments
dealing with current domestic merger problems can be found in 62 COL.L.REv.
851 (1962) ; 111 U.PA.L.REv. (1962) ; 48 VA.L.Rxv. 1428 (1962).
405. § 414; 49 U.S.C.A. § 1384 (1958) allows the Board to exempt any
person affected by the anti-trust provisions of the Act.
406. American-Eastern Merger, Recommended Decisions of Ralph L. Wiser,
Hearing Examiner, Docket 133355, November 27, 1962, at 9 (Mimeograph
copy),
407. § 408(b); 49 U.S.C.A. § 1378(b) (1958). The Supreme Court has
viewed the phrase "public interest" as incorporating the criteria of § 102, 49
U.S.C.A. § 1302 (1958), of "competition to the extent necessary." Pan American Airways v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 9 L.Ed.2d 325 (1963). See Comment: 111 U.PA.L.REv. 195, 197 note 13 (1962).
408. § 408(b) ; 49 U.S.C.A. § 1378(b) (1958).
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tion or jeopardize another carrier," means that "monopoly" signifies the degree of control possessed by the new carrier and
that mergers are not prohibited unless the harmful results of
the merger are those produced by monopoly control. 40 9 In addition, under the McLean Trucking Case the Board may also look
to relevant anti-trust statutes for guidelines in formulating and
applying its anti-trust policies. 410 Consequently, the Board has
borrowed certain Clayton Act principles, such as the "substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly
clause." 411 In the United-Capital Merger Case the Board also
introduced the "failing company" doctrine as a criterion. 412 The
"line of commerce" and geographic market concepts have only
413
recently been applied.
B. FAcTuA

Cmi

Strengthening and improvement are the dual themes of the
Board's factual Criteria in merger cases. One important factor
in this regard is reduction of costs that will accrue to the new
carrier resulting from the merger. It is possible not only to reduce rates to the public with the savings, but also strengthen
the carrier's financial base in order to enable it to provide better
equipment, attract more capital, and secure more attractive credit
terms. 414 Consequently, the Board has refused a merger which
would not strengthen the acquiring carrier. For example, Braniff
was forbidden to acquire control of an affiliated carrier, Aeronavias Braniff, on the ground that the resulting financial drain
on Braniff from the unprofitable affiliate would hinder Braniff's ability to respond to the fast moving requirements of air
409. United Air Lines Transportation Corp. and Western Air ExpressInterchange of Equipment, 1 C.A.A. 723, 733-34, 739 (1940). In view of inappropriateness of the traditional definition of monopoly in a regulated industry,
viz., the power to exclude competitors or fix prices, a new test has been suggested for air tansport: "that degree of control that deprives the public of satisfactory alternative service or threatens, by virtue of the unified carriers economic

power and prestige, to prevent the entry or successful operations of rivals."
Comment: 62 COL.L.REv. 851, 877 (1962).
410. McLean Trucking v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944). For an elaborate
treatment of the relationship of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to the
anti-trust powers of the C.A.B., see Pan American World Airways, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 296, 9 L.Ed.2d 325 (1963).
411. United-Capital Merger Care 1A Av.L.REP. 21132 (C.A.B., April
1961), aff'd sub nom. Northwest Airlines, Inc., v. C.A.B., 303 F.2d 395, 401-02
(D.C.Cir. 1962) ; F.T.C., 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
412. International Shoe Co. v. F.T.C., 280 U.S. 291, 74 L.Ed. 434 (1930).
413. See American-Eastern Merger, supra note 406, at 6-7.
414. See e.g., Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326, 341 (1954).
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transport.4 15 On the other hand, if the "failing company" cannot
be rejuvenated through other means and the resulting merger will
not weaken the acquiring carrier, the Board will reluctantly approve the merger. United's acquisition of Capital and Eastern's
merger with Colonial appears to have been the result of such a
situation. Capital was faced with imminent foreclosure on its
equipment; Colonial was running up ever increasing deficits;
16
neither had the prospect of improvement.
Economies that result from the integration of the merging
carrier's systems also have been considered significant but not
controlling in determining whether the proposed merger is in
the public interest.4 17 Savings are likely to result where the two
systems consist of short and spur routes since this type of system
encourages the use of older and inefficient aircraft. In addition,
the use of the equipment is likely to be inefficient. A substantial
proportion of time is spent in the relatively expensive maneuvers
of taxiing and climbing, and frequent lay-overs preclude maximum utilization of crew and equipment. Seasonal traffic load
problems may also be cured.416 The cases, however, seem to be
split on the weight that this factor will be given where there is
the issue of geographic disparity. For example, National, a carrier serving Florida and the east coast of the United States, was
forbidden to acquire a small local service carrier in the Caribbean on the ground that the carriers' disparite service patterns
made it unlikely that an integrated system would develop. 4 19 On
the other hand, when Western acquired Inland, the Board's opinion recognized that the lack of geographic integration was apparent. 420 The DeZta-Chicagoand Southemr case was little clearer
in its result.421 Delta served the southeast primarily; it had one
trunk route extending to Chicago. C & S was a Mississippi valley
415. Braniff Airways, Inc.-Acquisition of Aeronavias Braniff, S.A., 6 C.A.B.
947, 956-59 (1946); cf. United-Capital Merger Case, Docket 11699, Order E-

16605, April 3, 1961; a 'd sub nor Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 303 F.2d
395 (D.C.Cir. 1962).

416. Eastern-Colonial Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 453 (1954); supple-

mental opinion, 18 C.A.B. 781, 784 (1954). Eastern's control was not approved
until certain illegal relationships with Colonial were terminated. EasternColonial Control Case, 20 C.A.B. 629 (1955).
417. Delta-Chicago & Southern Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647, 689 (1952).
418. See e.g., MacKey-Midet Acquisition Case, 24 C.A.B. 51, 59 (1956);
Eastern-Colonial Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 784-85 (1954) ; supplemental
opinion to 18 C.A.B. 453 (1954); Acquisition of Marguette by TWA; 2 C.A.B.
1, 14, .tpplemental opiions, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940), 3 C.A.B. 111 (1941).
419. National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 C.A.B. 671, 676 (1946).
420. Western Airlines, Inc., Acquisition of Inland Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B.

654 (1944).
421. 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952).
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carrier with routes extending from Chicago to New Orleans. The
carriers were contiguous only along a north-south line, but the
Board approved the merger partly on the ground that the hypotenuse of Delta's triangular shaped route pattern would be
42 2
strengthened.
Route integration's greatest significance, however, does not lie
merely in the economies that it produces. Of greater importance
is the amount of new one-carrier service it incidentally provides. 423 This was considered the critical factor in the Delta-CdS

Merger case, discussed supra. 424 A desire to implement service
over authorized but inactive routes has also been deemed important.425 In one case, the strength of new one-carrier service
was so strong that the Board was willing to approve a merger
which resulted in monopoly between Houston and Kansas City,
a major domestic route.426 The effect of the decision, as one
writer noted, was to come close to saying that improved service
427
could override the statutes admonition against monopoly.

Nevertheless, other cases indicate that new service must be placed
in perspective. It will not justify disrupting the system of competitive balance fostered by the Board. For example, two small
but financially sound feeder carriers were not allowed to join
end to end to become a trunk carrier. 428 Of course, where there
is necessity for the merger and the Board is assured that trunkline traffic will not be diverted, approval may be forthcoming
if the overall proposal can be said to be in the public interest. 429
In determining the public interest the Board's policy of considering the prospective effect of the merger on other carriers
is of equal importance with the doctrine of new service. Termed
generally "diversion," the criterion looks directly to the heart
of the "monopoly control" provision of the Act.430 In the simplest sense of the word "diversion" the Board will look to see
422. Id. at 689-92.

423. Bluestone, Goals of the C.A.B. at 46 (December 1962) [hereinafter cited
as Bluestone].
424. 16 C.A.B. at 685.
425. Arizona-Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246, 247-48 (1950).
426. Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708, 735 (1952).
427. Barber, "Airline Mergers, Monoply, and the CAB," 28 J. AiR L. Comm.
189, 221 (1962).
428. North Central-Lake Central Acquisition Case, 25 C.A.B. 156, 159-60
(1957) ; affd sub norn., North Central Airlines v. CAB, 265 F.2d 581 (D.C.Cir.
1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959); Southwest-West Coast Merger Case,
14 C.A.B. 356, 357-58 (1951) (semble).
429. Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323, 329 (1955); West
Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 (1952); Arizona-Monarch Merger
Case, 11 C.A.B. 246 (1950); Monarch-Challenger Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33
(1950).
430. See note 409 supra.
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whether the proposed new service will attract so much traffic
from competing carriers as to render them incapable of serving
their routes adequately. 43 1 In effect the Board seeks to prevent
destructive competition which will weaken the affected carriers
and upset the competitive balance of the industry, even though
the public might initially benefit from some new service. Thus,
cases approving mergers where diversion was a factor speak of
the diversion as "not serious" or slight.4 32 Or they proclaim that
the diversionary effect is such that will spur a healthy competition between the merged carrier and the affected carriers. 433
It is in the cases disapproving merger on the ground of diversion that one gains the fullest picture of the policy of the Board.
eflecting its fear of power manifested in the international
cases,43 4 the Board has refused to approve mergers that would
introduce a carrier with superior identity into an area formerly
served by the acquired carrier. 453 In disapproving Amercian Airlines acquisition of a relatively small local service carrier the
Board set forth its rationale in the following language:
It is part of the generally accepted business concept of good
will that the company serving the larger number of customers to their satisfaction will on that account enjoy a competitive advantage. .

.

. American through mere volume and

geographical scope of its operations, inevitably holds a position of some favor over its competitors of more limited
operation, and this is a competitive advantage apart from

that gained by virtue of greater expenditures for advertising
and promotion and the various luxuries and extra services
which, generally speaking can be afforded only by the larger
43 6
organization.
431. Comment: 62 COLUm!.L.REV. 851, 870-71 (1962); American Airlines, Acquisition of Mid-Continent, 7 C.A.B. 365, 378-79 (1946); see Alaska Airlines,

Service to Anchorage, 3 C.A.B. 522, 526-28 (1942).
432. West Coast Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 976, 979, 998 (1952);
Monarch-Challenger Case, 11 C.A.B. 33 (1950).

433. Acquisition of Marquette Airlines by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 1, 9, supplemental
oPihions, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940), 3 C.A.B. 111 (1940). Eastern-Colonial Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 453, supplemental opinions, 18 C.A.B. 781 (1954);
20 C.A.B. 629 (1955) ; 23 C.A.B. 500 (1956).
434. See notes 341-353 supra and accompanying text.
435. American Airlines, Acquisition of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B.
365, 377-79 (1946); United Airlines Transport Corp., Acquisition of Western
Air Express Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739, 750 (1950); Comment: 62 CoLUM.L.REv.
851, 869 (1962); Note, 48 VA.L.REv. 1428, 1451 (1962).
436. American Airlines, Acquisition of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc., 7 C.A.B.
365, 378-79 (1946).
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Subsequent approval of a merger of Mid-Continent with Braniff,
a relatively weak trunkline carrier, was granted only after the
Board was satisfied that the systems of the carriers integrated in
such a manner that the new carrier could be strengthened by substantial reduction of expenses, that the public would receive substantial new service on four through-plane routes, and that no
serious diversion traffic from other carriers would result.437 Sub-

sequent cases appear to have continued the Board's fear of the
destructive capabilities of the preeminent air carrier.438 For ex-

ample, in rejecting the proposed American-Eastern Merger the
examiner's report concludes: "There is grave danger that the
merged corporation would so preempt the available air-transportation opportunities in the United States that sound economic
conditions in the air transportation industry could not be expected." 39
Since no cases have dealt directly with the merger in the complex setting of international aviation, it may be suggested that
the decided cases lend themselves only to rough analogies.
Since those pending international cases involving merger also
involve general considerations of the problem of competition, it
would seem more appropriate to treat them in the context of the
current trends and problems of the international air transport
industry in the United States.
VI.CURRENT TRENDS

A. ADJUDmCATORy METHODS
When one speaks of current trends in a regulated industry, it
is best to distinguish between activity within the industry and
that of the regulatory process. Too often the rates are manifestly
disparite. The situation may be in part the result of the natural
phenomenon of administrative lag. However, this does not justify
inordinate delay. The goal of an agency always should be to
achieve a rate of regulatory activity fairly reflecting the commercial activity in the industry so that the lag will not be prejudicial to applicants before it. Although the history of the CAB
437. Braniff Mid-Continent Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952).
438. Compare Flying Tiger-Slick Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326, 343 (1954),
with Arizona Monarch Merger Case, 11 C.A.B. 246, 247-48 (1950). See note,
111 UPA.L.REV.195, 211-12 (1962); note 48 VA.L.REv. 1428, 1453 (1962); but
see Comment, 62 COLuM.L.REv. 851, 870-71 (1962).
439. American-Eastern Merger Case, mipra, note 406, at 69.
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gives little indication that it has achieved this desirable goal ;439a
the recent flurry of activity at the agency would seem to indicate
that it may have acquired a new vigor.440 No doubt, much of it
is due to the sharp prods by Dean Landis and Judge Friendly.
Part of it may be attributed to a "new frontier" desire to be
"chic" in formulating standards. No matter what the motive may
be, the development is salutary; the public and the industry can
only be benefitted.
Perhaps the most important substantive result of the new
studies has been the proposal of David Bluestone, Chief of Planning for the CAB, for the adoption of a "management by exception" system of regulation. 41 This method would emphasize a
rule-making approach concentrating on major policy decisions
and long-range planning:
With rapidly growing case loads, the CAB will probably
have to shift its major effort from deciding great numbers
of individual cases to establishing basic principles and yardsticks under which fewer specific cases can be processed as
precedent determining "regulation by exception." It is essential that the CAB adopt basic principles, publicize them,
and follow them as precedent and until changed for clearly
stated reasons. Stability of policy should be such that the
major policy outcome is predictable for a substantial ma44
jority of cases.

2

Even with the virtue of stability in mind, Bluestone warns that
such a system should not be allowed to degenerate into mechanistic process:
The CAB should try to establish yardsticks in quantitative
terms whenever possible ....

However, yardsticks cannot

be precise mechanical formulas blindly programmed into
massive computes for automatic solutions. They are helpful
439a. The South American route investigation began in the National Route

Investigation Case, 12 C.A.B. 798 (1951). A preliminary decision was made in
New York-Balboa Through Service Proceedings Reopened, 18 C.A.B. 501
(1954). Not until 1961 did the Board undertake a comprehensive review. Presently the Board has taken 13 years of formal action to solve a problem that was
created 17 years ago in the Additional Service to Latin America Case, 6 C.A.B.
857 (1946).
440. Recent studies include Report of the Interagency Committee on Transport Mergers, March 6, 1963; The Interagency Steering Committee Report on
International Air Transport Policy, April 24, 1963. (Both hereafter cited to
mimeograph pagination.)
441. Bluestone, at 32.
442. Ibid.
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in the exercise of human judgment but cannot be replace-

443
ments for it.

Finally, Bluestone outlines the mechanics of the "regulation by
exception system":
These measures should help greatly to reduce the number
and complexity of CAB cases. They should set reasonable
principles and quantitative standards, with realistic margins
above and below the standard values to provide zones of
reasonable variation. Airlines should be able to act with
some reliance on a high probability that actions subject to
regulation would norally be approved if they fell within the
margins; if they fell outside, the applicant would carry the
requirement that he demonstrate the reasonableness of his
requested deviation from the standards. This would tend to
act as a strong deterrent to the generation of new cases, or
444
to reduce their size and complexity.

B.

CUlpxNT ROUTT

INVESTIGATIONS AND PROPOSALS

The new method of adjudication is indeed timely, for there is
little doubt that the air transport industry is undergoing the
greatest ferment since the period at the close of the Second World
War. If recent industry maneuvers are any indication of the
future, the proceedings at the CAB can only become more complicated. 44 5 In all of the proceedings, however, two basic issues
will predominate:
1. To what extent is competition necessary?
2. To what extent may merger be used to accomplish the
goals of the Federal Aviation Act?
Resolution of these issues will not be easy. No one should expect
a simple solution or even a universally satisfying one. Nevertheless, the vitality of the administrative process within the CAB,
and the public interest entrusted to a proper functioning of that
process, demand some solution in the very near future.
The necessity for action by the Board is clear. As the opening
paragraphs of this article indicate, American carriers in international air transport are faced with vastly different conditions
from those which they faced in the post World War II era. Old
443. Ibid.
444. Id. at 32-33.

445. See discussion of current trends in merger infra.
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policies simply do not meet the contemporary needs. The pressures are vastly different. Rather than fostering a carpe diem
expansion of American air services, they encourage retrenchment
and protection. This tendency, of course, wars with the statutory
policy in behalf of "an air transport system properly adapted to
comthe present and future needs of the foreign and domestic
44
merce" and of "competition to the extent necessary." 6
As the President's Interagency Steering Committee declared,
United States influence in international aviation "must be placed
on the side of expansion not restriction." However, neither the
act, nor the President's Committees, nor any other responsible
parties, call for the abandonment of the carriers to laissez-faire
competition. 447 The Board has a mandate to protect the carriers
individually and to promote the public interest by fostering a
system of transport "properly adapted" to the needs of commerce
and the national interest. This is a demand for regulated competition, that basic paradox which calls for "the use of competition to produce the results that competition could not produce."

4 48

The major reason advanced for a policy of retrenchment has
been the competition from foreign carriers. They have progressively increased their share of the international market as the
share of American carriers has fallen. The disturbing factor is
that foreign carrier participation has not been keyed to the increase in travel of foreign nations, but it has continually outstripped the growth in travelers from the carriers' own nations.
The figures plainly indicate that it is the American traveler who
is contributing to this increase.4 4 9 It is this fact which has led
American carriers to call for retrenchment and for a re-examination of Board policies of competition. The reasoning is that the
American carrier has enough to do in competing with the numerous foreign carriers without having to compete with another
American carrier in the rich domestic market. It follows that a
reduction in competition among American carriers is in order
if the industry is to be preserved.
The Board and other governmental bodies involved in the
problems of international aviation seem sympathetic to the pleas
of the industry. However, they have been careful to re-affirm
the fundamental United States policy in favor of competition.
446.
447.
448.
449.

§ 102; 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (1958).
Supra note 440, at 1.
Bluestone, at 32. See discussion of competition supra.
Project Horizont 108-110.
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The South American Route Case investigation was opened to
investigate the question of "the need for point-to-point duplication of such services,"4 50 but the staff study declares that its goal
is to see "that balanced competition is to be assured."45 1 The
report in the TransAtlantic Route Renewal Case plainly states:
"The staff does not believe that it is time to abandon the historic
national policy of regulated competition for a policy of U. S.
monopoly in the North Atlantic." 452 The President's Interagency
Committee finds that the policy "is sound, and deserves to be
reaffirmed.1 45 3 The reason underlying the governmental unity
is the strong belief that the air transport system "should continue
to benefit from that irreplaceable stimulus to growth brought by
competitive enterprise.1 454 But an important departure from
older policies has been made. Formerly the Board believed that
competitive stimulus could only come from competition between
domestic carriers in international air transport. The belief was
that national loyalties would inhibit access to information that
could be used as a "yardstick" to measure the efforts of the
American carrier. 455 The staff report in the TransAtlantic case
adopts a realistic view in urging rejection of the old policy:
Clearly today this earlier reasoning does not support direct
point-to-point U. S. carrier competition. As long as U. S.
manufactured equipment is superior to foreign equipment, it
is even purchased by foreign flags. If foreign aircraft proves
[sic] superior in the future, it might become an economic
necessity for our carriers to purchase it. As for national
loyalties, the blue-ribbon North Atlantic offers ample evidence that this reasoning is now outmoded. In fact since
1950, the U. S.-flag participation has closely paralleled the
U. S.-flag percentage of seats available in this market and
not the percentage of U. S. citizens in the market. .

.

. Dur-

ing the past 12 years the foreign flags have demonstrated
456
that they can supply the competitive spur desired.
In viewing the future of air commerce the reports again insist
that realism be the principal ingredient in the formulation of
450. United States-South America Route Investigation, Docket 12895, Order
E-19792, August 8, 1961, at 2.
451. Id. at 25.
452. Id. at 17.
453. Supra note 440, at 11.
454. Id. at 2.
455. See, e.g., American Export Lines, Trans-Atlantic Service, 2 C.A.B. 16,
32 (1940).
456. Supra note 450 at 19-20. See notes 347-48 supra and accompanying text.
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new policies on traffic potential. The problems of the industry
may be serious, but the policy-matters need not be swayed by
an atmosphere of false crisis. Although the United States carriers'
relative share of traffic has been declining as total traffic
zoomed at an average growth rate of fifteen percent per year,
the important thing is that the absolute amount of traffic carried
has remained healthy.457 The Interagency Committee report
states:
A realistic view of the future suggests that the same forces
may result in some further decline in the relative share. The
same look into the future tells us that, in any event, the
U. S. international air carriers should continue to grow at an
impressive rate, one considerably greater than the growth
rate of our economy as a whole. We are dealing with a U. S.
industry growing in size and maturity; not one which is sick
and declining and can be expected to fade away to obscurity
5
or death."41
The good health of the industry seems to be indicated by reports
of higher earnings and increased traffic. Pan American's earnings, for example, rose in 1962 to $2.23 per share from $1.34 in
1961.459 TWA, which has been beset by a variety of managerial

trouble, has continued to show healthy increases in traffic and
460
revenue in its international operations.
Although the study groups have maintained a fundamentally
optimistic approach to the future of international air transport,
they have been quick to reject any things of the old carpe diem
philosophy. The facts of today's aviation market are different
from those of fifteen or twenty years ago, since "the present network of international air routes . . .is rather fully developed."

"Consequently," one group warns, "expansion of the present
routes must be approached with caution." 4 1 The emphasis must
be on traffic potential; in other words, a bona fide public need
for additional service. As David Bluestone states: "The basic
advantages of 'competition' . . . require that there be effetive
457. Interagency Steering Committee Report on International Air Transport
Policy, supra note 440, at 3.
458. Id. at 4. This seems to reject the chosen instrument policy.
459. Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1963, p. 10, col. 3; see ibid., May 10, 1963,
p. 16, col. 3 where it is reported that the normal seasonal deficit has been halved.
460. Wall Street Journal, April 23, 1963, p. 5, col. 2; ibid., April 26, 1963,

p. 22, col. 5. It is interesting to note that TWA's losses occur principally on
domestic routes. Ibid., October 8, 1962, p. 2, col. 3.

461. Interagency Steering Committee Report on InternationalAir Transport,

supra note 440, at 7.
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qivalry.1462 This situation of course -will not result where the
competition is economically unjustifiable. Accordingly, it has
been recommended that, first, there be no "forced flag flying" 463 ;
and, second, that point-to-point duplication of services be allowed only where the traffic will support at least two profitable
jet round-trips per day. 464 It would seem that a return to a policy of public need is long overdue. One can only speculate how
much lost time and money could have been saved had the Board
465
adopted and adhered to this approach from the beginning.
The problem remains, however, of resolving the conflicts between the various policies and the factual problems facing the
industry-competition, foreign flags, and duplication. The solution that has been generally endorsed is a return to the zonal
system of competition. This would allow American carriers to
compete with foreign-flag carriers in the principal traffic centers; at the same time they would compete against each other
generally serving roughly contiguous zones; point-to-point duplication of American carrier services would be minimized. Perhaps
the clearest statement of this policy is found in the report of the
Interagency Steering Committee, which declares:
We should continue to aim for a U. S. carrier system in
which one U. S. flag carrier has access to world markets on
a scale comparable to that of the flag carriers of other major
civil aviation powers, and other U. S. carriers continue to
be authorized to serve one or more areas of the world in
4 6
overall competition with this carrier.
The advantage of the system is that while it maintains a balance
between monopoly and excessive competition, the benefits of
competition will be retained. The carriers themselves will benefit
since the system tends to establish "a balance between routes that
will permit reasonably equal traffic opportunities.-4 67 Thus, the
routes will "encourage U. S. carriers to exploit their authority
to the fullest and thereby recapture to the fullest as large a por462. Bluestone, at 7.

463. Interagency Steering Committee Report on International Air Tramport
Policy, supra note 440, at 8.
464. Project Horizon 120; Bluestone, at 41.
465. See New York-Florida Renewal Case, Docket 12285, Order 19910, August 15, 1963.
466. Interagency Steering Committee Report on International Air Transport
Policy, supra note 440, at 12.
467. United States South America Route Investigation, Docket 12895, Order
E-17289, August 8, 1961, at 30a.
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tion of the market as possible."4 0 8 More importantly the public
will receive the benefits of the competitive stimulus. In the North
Atlantic routes the staff finds that "the stage would be set for
the two flag carriers, Pan American and TWA, not only to pit
their full strength against the foreign flags in their exclusive
markets rather than against each other, but at the same time to
maintain a reciprocal yardstick as to the quality of U. S. flag
service and the ability of a U. S. flag carrier to compete with
foreign flag operators." 60
Although zonal competition may seem to have offered an easy
solution to the problems of the industry, one hardly needs to
emphasize that it is always easier to project a solution than to
achieve one. The problem, of course, is that "pioneers" routes are
going to be disturbed as the Board attempts to untangle the
different routes. Perhaps the best illustration of the complexity
of the route cases is the South American case. As the routes are
presently certificated, Pan American flies from New York, via
Miami, to the east coast of South America; Braniff, from DallasHouston, via Miami, to the west Coast; Panagra, from the Canal
Zone to the west coast, duplicating Braniff's routes. In addition
a system of interchanges supply Braniff and Panagra with traffic from the east coast of the United States. 470 The goal of the
CAB has been to reduce the duplicating service on the west coast
and to provide independent single carrier service from the eastern
United States. 471 The interchanges were introduced as a stop-gap
measure, but they have concededly failed.47 2 The proposed route
system would divide South America into two geographic sectors,
A, the east coast and B, the west coast. Route A would enter
47 3
Both
South America at Curacao; Route B at the Canal Zone.

sectors would be served by direct service from New York; traffic
from the midwest would connect at Miami. Balance between the
routes would be achieved by eliminating all point-to-point duplication except for the joint terminus of Buenos Aires, which is
468. North Atlantic Renewal Case, Docket 13577, Order E-18301, May 4,

1962, at 16-17 (mimeograph copy).

469. Id. at 18.
470. These interchanges are a Pan American-Panagra interchange from New
York via Miami, a National-Pan American-Panagra interchange from New
York and points south via Miami, and an Eastern-Braniff interchange from
New York and points south via Miami. United States South America Route
Investigation, Docket 12895, Order E-17289, August 8, 1961, at 15-19 (mimeograph copy).
471. Ibid. See discussion of "route planning" and "strengthening weak carrier" supra.
472. Supra note 470 at 16, 18.
473. Id. at 25, 27.
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termed "the Southernmost anchor" of the respective route systems. 474 Each route would also have access to Brazil. Rio would

be on route A; and since Rio traffic probably will be diverted
as activity increases at the new capital, Brasilia, that city has
also been included on route A. Balance would be maintained by
placing San Paulo on Route B.47 5 Since Delta has had serious
difficulty in penetrating the South American Market because of
inadequate routes and a lack of "identity" in the market, problems of diversion would be minimized by removing Delta's certification to serve Caracas and points in the Caribbean. 476 In addition, the carriers would be protected from uneconomical service
by forbidding them to enter into local service in South America.
Only the "historic gateways" would receive American carrier
477
service.
The TransAtlantic report follows a similar pattern. At present
there is duplication of services by the American carriers, TWA
and Pan American, at London, Paris, Frankfurt and Rome, the
principal gateways to Europe. The staff recommends that the
best solution to problems on the TransAtlantic routes would be
to eliminate duplication entirely by substituting zonal competition. Under this proposal TWA would be certificated to serve
Paris and Rome; Pan American, London and Frankfurt. This
would be a "healthy" competition "since one carrier would be
bidding for the customer to begin his European tour at the nearest major gateway, London, and the other at the most distant
gateway, Rome." 478 Although the arrangement would preclude
United States flag operations between London and Paris or
Rome, or Frankfurt and Paris or Rome, the staff argues that this
is a "realistic" step and that the only loss of traffic will be
Frankfurt-Rome, which is a small price to pay since there is no
47 9
"Fifth Freedom" traffic available between the other points.
If the Board wishes to retain a policy of direct competition at
major gateways, the staff proposes an alternative system of
routes. The test of adequate traffic potential would turn on
whether there was enough traffic to support one jet round-trip
per day per carrier with 120 seat equipment, a 55 per cent load
factor, and 957 performance factor. London, Paris, and Rome
474. Id. at 29.
475. Id. at 28-29.
476. Id. at 28.
477. Id. at 24; local service would be eliminated; Id. at 21, 32.
478. North Atlantic Route Renewal Case, Docket 13577, Order E-18301, May
4, 1962, at 21.
479. Id. at 23-24.
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qualify for duplicating service under this criterion. In addition
Frankfurt would qualify as a gateway exception since "hidden
transAtlantic traffic through Frankfurt is of such volume that
that point would also qualify for competitive service under the
standard." 480 A second alternative would allow competitive service only at London and Paris. Under this proposal the focus of
American international carrier operations would be shifted to
those two points; Frankfurt and Rome would become marginal
operations. This would demand that they be served by Pan
American and TWA respectively on an exclusive basis. The disadvantage of the proposal is that much of the "beyond-gateway"
traffic would be limited. Most of TWA's service would have to
deadend at London and most of Pan American's at Paris because
4
of weak traffic potential for service beyond those points. 1
In order to maintain healthy, balanced, and economic operations, the staff recommends the elimination of competition at all
other European traffic centers, which include Lisbon, Madrid,
and Shannon. For example, because Lisbon "integrates more
logically" with TWA's Madrid-Rome and points beyond route,
Pan American would be prevented from serving Lisbon on its
flights eastward. However, Lisbon would remain a point on Pan
American's South Atlantic route to points in Africa since many
passengers desire a European stop-over. In addition the route
could gain "support" from European passengers. 48 2 Even though
Pan American has been certificated by the CAB to serve Madrid
from San Juan, Pan American would lose those rights because
the necessary operating rights can be
there is no likelihood 4that
8
obtained from Spain. 1
The bright symbol of American supremacy in international
aviation, the second around-the-world service, would be scuttled.
Because the growth of traffic beyond Cairo will probably be
inadequate to provide for a sufficient frequency operation for
effective penetration of the market, TWA would lose its routes
from Cairo to Hong Kong. 4 4 The older cases and the recent
Trans-Pacific case48 6 are rejected by the staff on the ground
that they were based upon "a policy involving a greater degree
of competition than the policy we now believe is called for in the
480. Id. at 25-26.
481. Id. at 27-28.

482. Id. at 29-30.
483. Id. at 30-31.

484. Id. at 38-39.
485. Trans-Pacific Route Case, Docket 7723 et al., Order E-16286, December

7, 1960.
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Atlantic." 48 6 The points on the excised route would be transferred to Pan American in order to protect "national defense and
other considerations.1 48 7 National defense is also the consideration for affirming route awards at Casablanca and Lagos. 4 88 As
in the SoutAh American case, all local service would be prohibited
as an economic drain on the primarily long-haul American car48 9
riers.
The proposed zonal system of competition may be the solution
to the industry's problems. Other answers, however, are being
offered. The giant of the industry, Pan American, would remove
the clogs on progress by merging with its principal competitors
in the two major markets presently under consideration by the
Board. This would involve merger with TWA 490 and acquisition
of Panagra. 49 1 There is little doubt that the carrier's major
troubles would be dissipated. The trouble with this convenient
solution is that, like so many other market-place arrangements,
it tends to ignore the public interest in "competition to the extent
necessary" 492 and the ban on "any consolidation, merger . . . or
acquisition of control which result in creating monopoly or
monopolies and thereby restrain competition or jeopardize another carrier. . . ."49 Thus, the second major issue facing the
Board in present proceedings is: To what extent may merger be
used to accomplish the goals of the Federal Aviation Act?
As David Bluestone has noted, the Federal Aviation Act contains a built-in paradox: "The use of competition to produce the
results that competition could not produce." 494 Of course, he is
speaking of a system of regulated competition under the Federal
Aviation Act as opposed to a pure system of competition. This
system has led the Board to look favorably on mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions of control which lead to improved serv486. Instant case at 39.

487. Id. at 38. Defense considerations are a considerable problem. They oppose economical service since they are based on considerations other than traffic
potential. See note 463 supra and accompanying text. The stand against "forced
flag" flying by the Interagency Steering Committee adds another complication.
See note 463 supra. It is ironic that in an attempt to clarify policy standards
this committee failed to clarify the meaning of this term. Quaere: Does it refer
to meeting foreign competition, national defense, or duplicating service between
domestic carriers?
488. Id. at 55, 62-63 citing North Atlantic Certificate Renewal Case, 15 C.A.B.

1053 (1951).
489. Id. at 58-60.
490. See e.g., Wall Street Journal, May 27, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.
491. See e.g., Wall Street Journal, April 19, 1963, p. 4, col. 2.
492. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (1958).
493. § 408(b), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1378(b) (1958).
494. Bluestone, at 32.
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ice. Financial strengthening of carriers 495 and integration of
carrier systems leading to improved service 49 6 have been approved as being in the public interest. But the Board has been
equally vigilant to see that the degree of control possessed by the
merged carrier would not jeopardize other carriers 497 or deprive
498
the public of the benefits of competition.
When the industry was composed largely of small carriers,
relatively simple criteria would serve in making a determination
of the public interest. That situation no longer prevails today
with an industry dominated by long-haul carriers. A merger
among the giant trunk-line carriers strains the earlier developed
concepts. As the problem of competition has stimulated the development of criteria to fit modern circumstances, so also has the
problem of mergers of the trunk-line cariers brought forth suggested criteria for testing the public interest value of the proposal. It has been argued for example, that the old monopoly
control test may be unsuited. In its place the following test has
been suggested: "That degree of control that deprives the public
of satisfactory alternative service or threatens, by virtue of the
unified carriers' economic power and prestige, to prevent the
entry or successful operation of rivals." 499 Thus, this test would
focus on the problem of assuring the public the benefits of an
optimum competition between fully effective competitors within
the industry. The goal of such a merger would be to make available more new service and to effect a resultant system of balanced competition in the way that a system of zonal competition
seeks to achieve a healthy balance among competitors. 500 Introduction of a carrier of undue economic power or dominance into
495. E.g., Flying Tiger-Slick Airways Merger Case, 18 C.A.B. 326, 341

1954). But see, Braniff Airways Inc.-Acquisition of Aeronavias Braniff S.A.,
C.A.B. 947, 956-59 (1946).
496. E.g., McHay-Midet Acquisition Case, 24 C.A.B. 51, 59 (1956) ; EasternColonial Acquisition Case, 18 C.A.B. 453; supplemental opinion, 18 C.A.B. 784
(1954) ; 20 C.A.B. 629 (1955). But see, North Central-Lake Central Acquisition
Case, 25 C.A.B. 156, 159 (1957), aff'd sub iwm.; North Central Airlines v.
CAB, 265 F.2d 581 (D.C.Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1958).
497. American Airlines Inc.-Acquisition of Mid-Continent Airlines, Inc.,
7 C.A.B. 365, 377-79 (1946); Acquisition of Marquette Airlines by TWA
2 C.A.B. 1, supplentental opinion, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940); 3 C.A.B. 111 (1941) ;
United Airlines Transportation Corp., Acquisition of Western Air Express
Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739, 750 (1940); cf. Pan American World Airways Inc.Domestic Route Case, 11 C.A.B. 852 (1950).
498. See, e.g., American-Eastern Merger Case, Docket 13355, November 27,
1962, at 33-38; Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 976, 979, 998 (1952).
499. Comment: 62 COLUm.L.REV. 851, 877 (1962).
500. Bluestone, at 45, 46.
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the markets of carriers not a party to the merger would probably
be prohibited. 0 I
The problem with the proposed Pan American mergers is that
they would achieve neither the goals of competitive service-they
would virtually abolish it-nor those of merger. In fact, they
would twist the merger issue around to something quite different
from what it is intended to be. In effect it would become: To
what extent can mergers be used to wreck the Board's attempts
to provide a competitive balance?
An inspection of the merger proposals and their effects on the
markets indicates that wreckage is exactly what the staff studies
of the routes would become. In South America, for example, the
Board has sought to provide a competitor, independent of any
link with Pan American, to serve the west coast of South America from a mainland terminus at New York City. In order to do
this the Board is faced with the necessity of combining the present west coast routes of Braniff and Panagra. Nevertheless, Pan
American proposes to purchase the fifty percent interest of W. R.
Grace in Panagra. 50 2 Although Pan American has disclaimed
any intention of merging with Panagra and has announced that
it will continue to operate Panagra as a separate entity, it takes
the simplest mathematics to figure out that Panagra would be
Pan American's wholly owned subsidiary. One need hardly pause
to conclude that the introduction of Pan American's undiluted
economic power into the west coast market would break the frail
hold that Braniff presently has. In effect Pan American would
be competing against itself-a situation only one step from the
chosen instrument. This would be a complete negation of the
Board's fundamentally sound policy of maintaining an independent carrier in the South American market that could be an
effective competitor against Pan American. 50 3
501. Siepra note 497. The Interagency Committee Report, supra note 440,
re-affirms the policy against the chosen instrument on the traditional economic
grounds and apparently because of a "fear of power" that the monopoly carrier
would intrude in the implementation of foreign policy. "Government flexibility
in implementing international, political and aviation policies would be reduced if
the interests of any single carrier became, over the long run, too dominant a
factor in U.S. aviation policy." Ibid. at 11. See 15 S.C.L.REv. 892, note 127 and
accompanying text on the 1944 C.A.B. memorandum on carrier intervention in
diplomatic negotiations.
502. Wall Street Journal, April 14, 1963, p. 4, col. 2.
503. Braniff has countered the Pan American maneuver by offering to buy
the interests of Pan American and W. R. Grace in Panagra. Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1963, p. 2, col. 3. Although Pan American and Grace have insisted
that the proposal is a high-minded attempt to save the industry from destructive
foreign competition, one must wonder just how lofty their motives are. The
reaction of the President of W. R. Grace Co. to the Braniff offer was the fol-
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A similar problem exists in respect to the North Atlantic
routes. Once again Pan American has proposed to eliminate its
principal competitor, TWA, through a merger. 50 4 High purpose
and an atmosphere of crisis dominate the press releases of the
two companies. Their object is to provide effective competition
against foreign carriers. 50 5 Their means is justified, according to
TWA officials, "as a question of survival."5 0 6 Glowing statements over cost, savings and more efficient use of equipment
issue almost daily. For example, it has been claimed that the
combined company would have a $19,000,000 profit the first year
50 7
of operation.
The trouble with the barrage of expertly composed reports is
that they have failed to persuade any one other than the authors
that there is a high purpose crisis sufficient to justify a return
to the chosen instrument policy through the merger route. Certainly, reports from the industry itself belie the idea of crisis,
or that the merger was a "question of survival." Pan American's
earnings were up over $1.00 per share last year, and 1963 bookings are up 10 per cent over last year.508 The amazing thing
about TWA's losses is that they all occurred on the domestic
routes; it has been the earnings from international routes that
reduced the heavy deficit. The fact that much of TWA's troubles
stem from bad management seems to have been overlooked. 0 9 It
would seem that the alleged $19,000,000 profit of the combined
company5 10 is an illusory saving since neither carrier has demonstrated any incapability in the international field. There is no
lowing: "Braniff is trying to mess it up." Wall Street Journal, May 5, 1963,
p. 2, col. 1. Since this article was completed the Board has tentatively rejected
the Pan-Am bid to buy the rest of Panagra on the ground that § 411 of the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1381 (1958), outlawing unfair
competition had been violated through existing interlocking relationships since
"Pan American through use of its negative control of Panagra appears to have
prevented that carrier from instituting any competitive service to the east coast
whenever Panagra proposed to take such action." Pan American-Panagra Acquisition Case, Dockets 14452, 14641, Order E-19789, July 9, 1963, at 5.
504. E.g., Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1962, p. 28, col. 1.
505. Ibid.

506. Ibid.

507. Id., December 24, 1962, p. 3, col. 2.
508. Id., August 27, 1962, p. 20, col. 1.

509. Id., April 26, 1963, p. 22, col. 5.

510. The present management of TWA is seeking to permanently bar Howard
Hughes from control of the airline. Hughes owns 78% of the stock, which has
been placed in a voting trust as a result of insistence of creditors. The Hughes
interests have counterclaimed for damages on account of waste and mismanagement. In addition the Hughes interests have pleaded that the district court does

not have jurisdiction to divest them of control; the C.A.B., they assert, has primary jurisdiction. See Id., August 27, 1962, p. 20, col. 1; Id., May 3, 1963,
p. 4, col. 3; Id., May 6, 1963, p. 13, col. 2; Id., May 15, 1963, p. 19, col. 4.
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genuine reason to apply a "failing" carrier doctrine to either of
the carriers.
Another problem with the merger is that the benefits to the
public in terms of new service are virtually non-existent. There
is probably little public need for new direct service to Europe on
TWA's domestic routes, since gateway access already is provided
to the principal points on the continent. Moreover, it is doubtful
whether direct service from many points in the interior United
States would be such a substantial improvement over connecting
service as to warrant reversal of basic policies of competition.5 11
Assuming that there is sufficient traffic to support such service,
one wonders whether it would be in the public interest to introduce a giant carrier into the domestic markets. This is a real
problem because TWA has clearly stated that it would retain its
domestic routes. 512 Nevertheless, the teaching of the American
Airlines-Mid-Continentmerger case 513 and the PanAme7icanDomestic Routes Case51 4 is that introduction of an unduly dominant carrier into the domestic market would severely impair the
competitive balance among the domestic carriers.51 5 That this
would mean an acceptance of the forbidden chosen instrument
policy is explicitly recognized and rejected in the Domestic Route
Case.516 It may well be that administrative cases generally cannot be expected to have the precedential value that a common
law property case has, but it would seem that this is certainly
one time where the previous cases not only set forth the criteria
governing the administrative resolution but also control it.
Whether they will, only time can tell. And at the CAB, that can
really take time.
VII. CONCLUSION
When the work of a decision making organization is being
assessed, there is great temptation to stress the difference in result as the critical factor. Another similar approach tests the
instant case by juxtaposing a felicitously phrased statement of
the holding of an earlier "correctly" decided case. By the simple
process of deduction, error can be inferred in the suspect deci511. Compare New York-Mexico City Nonstop Service Case, 25 C.A.B. 323
(1957) ; Pan American Airways-Domestic Route Case, 11 C.A.B. 852 (1950).
512. Wall Street Journal, December 27, 1962, p. 10, col. 3; Id., December 31,

1962, p. 9, col. 3.

513. 7 C.A.B. 365, 378-81 (1946).
514. 11 C.A.B. 852, 885 (1950).

515. See American-Eastern Merger Case, supra note 498, at 41-43, 64, 66-68.
516. 11 C.A.B. 852, 933-34 (1950).
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sion. Both methods are easy to perform, but neither truly lends
itself to accurate analysis.5 17 When the object of analysis is an
administrative agency decision, it is apparent that these facile
methods are even more inappropriate, for the agency decision encompasses vast numbers of economic variables. In this field of
law it is the unwary critic who places great weight upon an
apparent difference in results.
Nevertheless, the goal of every decision making process is to
decide like cases in a like manner. As Judge Friendly and others
have persuasively argued, there is no reason to exempt an administrative agency from this fundamental requirement of human
reason. The courts attempt to achieve this desired uniformity of
result through establishments of rules of law. Judge Friendly
urges that the agency can achieve reasonable uniformity through
the use of definitions of agency policy standards, or administrative criteria. Analysis of the decisions would proceed somewhat in the same way that legal decisions are criticized.11 8 The

problem, of course, is the factor of the economic variables. They
may well preclude this type of analysis. However, as Professor
Jaffe has observed, this should not deter critics from insisting
on an effective operating rationale. 19 It is here that the study
of administrative standards becomes truly important.
It must be emphasized that this survey has not attempted to
weigh the economic issues involved in economic air transport in
the manner of a professional transportation economists. Such an
investigation is beyond the scope of this study. But it is important to note that the objective signs of the international air transport industry indicate that the domestic carriers in the field are
becoming increasingly healthy. This is as much a tribute to the
Board's policies on entry as it is to the vitality of the carriers.
Perhaps the Board's decisions could have taken better advantage
of the economic situation. However, this should not be allowed
to detract from the CAB's achievements in selecting carriers who
were truly fit, willing, and able to enter international air commerce. The Board's early decisions did launch an extensive
United States flag operation which has suffered no economic
fatalities. Moreover, the carriers have survived numerous adverse influences ranging from presidential interference in the
basic route pattern to extensive foreign carrier competition. In
517. Cf. French, "Unconstitutional Constitutional Conditions: An Analysis,"

50 GEo.L.J. 240 (1962).

518. Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need For Better
Definition of Standards, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1318 (1962). [hereinafter cited as

Friendly].
519. Jaffe, Book Review, 76 H~Av. L. REv. 858, 864 (1963).
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the face of the serious economic problems that have faced the
industry since the end of World War II, this is a remarkable
record.
An evaluation of CAB policies must also credit the Board for
its earlier efforts at route planning. The 1944 memorandum that
set forth the basic international routes was probably the most
significant document in the history of the industry. 20 This
memorandum laid out a competitively balanced system in advance of the adjudicatory proceedings. In the subsequent hearings the effect of this move was to emphasize the public convenience and necessity for service over the route and thereby to keep
the public interest from being lost in the mass of factors involved
in selection of the carrier for the route. Flexibility was retained
since the route integration arguments of the carriers meant that
some modification of the proposed routes would take place. If
the method was followed, it could prevent happenstance growth
-the unsettling feature of the expansion of the domestic route
systems. Presidential interference again hindered full effectiveness of Board policy. Nevertheless, the Board was able to approach its goal in the early cases. Its abandonment in later cases
for a trial-and-error patchwork system which dragged along
case by case is one of the unexplained wonders that abound in
the jungle of administrative agency decisions. The revival of the
route planning approach in the current investigations is long
overdue.
The most controversial CAB decisions involve the mystic
phrase "competition to the extent necessary". Many critical
broadsides have been discharged justly at the Board for its failure to define its policies on competition. Jaffe declared that "in
the course of its short history the Board has shown an almost
incredible flexibility in moving toward and away from competition." 521 Judge Friendly scornfully declared: "The Board's history is a prime example of an agency's failure to grasp the nettle
522
which can make a relatively easy problem hard."
One may doubt whether a solution to the problems of competition is "relatively easy." There is substance to the charges of
the critics, but it seems more accurate to say that the Board's
failures to define its policies on competition made a hard problem ultimately more difficult to solve. The proliferation of car520. Was this the "Judge Cooley opinion" called for by judge Friendly? See
Friendly at 885.
521. Jaffe, Book Review, 65 YALE L. J. 1068, 1074 (1956).

522. Friendly, at 1097.
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riers on domestic routes is one example. In the international
field a major problem is the CAB's failure to define policies
23
directly affecting competition within a context of competition.
The conflicts of interest policies are a ready example. The fear
of tying up one carrier with an exclusive sales agency probably
has a strong kinship with the policy against excessive control
or dominance in the field of mergers. The policy against mixing
local and long-haul service is probably related to the "benefits
to the public" policy favoring domestic carrier competition. Certainly, the stand against the chosen instrument bears strongly
on the proposed mergers among the domestic carriers in international air commerce. By their silence, Board decisions indicate
no awareness of any harmony among the various policies. Nevertheless, every time a decision involving one of these criteria is
made, it directly affects the competitive status of the industry.
Another area where the CAB has been careless of standards is
the decisions involving initial service over a route. The goal of
the decision should always be to provide the service needed by
the public. Diversion from other carriers, which might unbalance
the route system, individually and ensemble, should be avoided.
The primary ingredient of such a decision is the Board's estimate
of traffic potential. Although the Board might faithfully follow
the criteria for determining the potential, in too many decisions
the Board's exercise of expert judgment was unduly influenced
by a blithe attitude of "optimism." The CAB's avid pursuit of
the second round-the-world service provides many excellent examples of the hazards of this brand of reasoning, for the danger
always remains that the Board in a burst of enthusiasm will over
extend the carriers. Where the selection of a carrier has been the
issue, the CAB's record is notorious. The color of title cases indict
themselves. The unfortunate feature of this type of ad hoc decision making is that the effect on policies of competition seems
to have been overlooked. Were the Board's reasoning on "color
of title" to stand, both the public need for the best service available and a carrier's ability to provide that service would be completely ignored. Even the necessity to maintain balanced route
systems would become only an inconsequential factor.
Where duplicating service has been the problem, the Board's
record is somewhat brighter. Because the zonal or gateway system of competition severely limits duplication, the Board has
523. One wonders whether the Board might not have unified and clarified its
policies with "a rule of reason" approach similar to that of the traditional antitrust laws.
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avoided a proliferation of domestic carriers on the international
routes. Of course, the foreign carriers provide an abundance of
duplicating service. In regard to them the CAB has shown an
increasingly realistic attitude. In the early days of international
aviation it was no doubt reasonable to insist that the benefits of
competition would not accrue to the American traveler unless
American carriers were competing directly on the foreign routes.
In that age of nationalism, national loyalties probably would
have deprived the public of competition even though there might
be duplicating service offered. For this reason the chosen instrument was rejected. The experience of the postwar years has demonstrated that problem of the national loyalties is not so severe
as it was once thought. Accordingly, the Board has relaxed its
policies on duplicating service in the belief that competition with
the foreign carrier will stimulate improvements in service. Nevertheless, the Board has wisely refused to consider installing a
chosen instrument system. Domestic carrier duplicating service
may not be needed to provide competitive stimulus, but there is
still a strong argument in behalf of zonal competition.
If the Board is to be censured for ignoring public need in
route award cases, it must be commiserated in certain aspects of
the determination of public convenience and necessity. At the
same time that the Federal Aviation Act directs the CAB to
mold a national system of air transport and competition to the
extent necessary, it plainly orders the Board to ignore the demands of economy in several vital respects. The Act makes several special provisions for improving mail service. The Act also
directs that national defense needs be considered. That the Board
should have difficulty reconciling the policies is inevitable. Mail
pay at least helps the carrier meet operating costs, but there is
not compensation for meeting national defense needs. Presently,
the Board has a definite program to reduce any mail pay in the
form of subsidies. Yet no one would deny the desirability, even
the necessity, of having American flag service in the developing
nations of the world. The problem is that these places have such
limited traffic potential that profit making service is presently
impossible. One wonders whether the Board wisely might not
consider a contract incentive system to aid the extension of
American flag service.
Another factor mitigating against an economically sound competitive system is the problem of presidential interference. Case
after case demonstrates that the clearest stated policies are use-
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less when a third person has unfettered power not only to ignore
the decision of an expert body but also to substitute judgment
for it. Much of the present trouble with the South American
routes can be traced to presidential certification of duplicating
service on the West Coast. The problem of excessive duplicating
service on the North Atlantic routes can also be attributed to a
fateful White House letter installing duplicating service at all
major gateways. Similarly, the jumble of Pacific route investigations is the result of presidential action. It is ironic that the
Board's task in each of recent route investigations has been to
restore the status quo.
It is apparent that many of the CAB's problems are not its

own making. The statutory commands are confusing and contradictory. Presidential interference hinders comprehensive regulation. But these clogs in the administrative process do not excuse
the Board's fundamental failure in the exercise of its duties.
A failure to establish administrative standards is only symptomatic of a lack of initiative in seeking administrative as well
as legislative solutions to the problems of international air commerce. Too often the Board has pretended that a problem did

not exist, or it has delayed action beyond reason in the hope that
the worrisome thing would go away. The effect has only been
to postpone action. When a remedy is finally proposed, it may
be nothing more than could have been done earlier; or worse,
it may be such strong medicine that some of the carriers may
expire. That a lack of initiative is the Board's greatest flaw is
underscored by the few occasions that it did take imaginative
action. In the New Yorks-Mexico City case it indicated that presidential interference need not freeze the route system. 52 4 Moreover, that decision also suggests that the Board need not defer to
a presidential order where no public need has been demonstrated.
The current route investigations confirm this.
Thus, what the CAB really needs is imagination, vigor, and
the courage to implement solutions to industry problems. It is
here that the force of Judge Friendly's criticism truly applies.
Administrative criteria and policy statements can never overcome intellectual lassitude, for statements of policy too easily
become another series of Washington platitudes. The use of
administrative criteria in decisions can degenerate into a label

525
pasting process designed to perfect an appeal-proof decision.

524. 25 C.A.B. 323, 326-329 (1957).

525. Hector, Problems of the C.A.B. and the Independent Regulatory Coln-

missions, 69 YALE L. J. 931, at 942, 947 (1960).
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Only the adoption of a critical attitude by the decision-maling
process can prevent this.5 26 Agency personnel are the first who
must display this quality, but other members of the legal community must also meet the standard. This is the crux of Judge
Friendly's argument. In a strongly worded appeal he declares:
Yet, with a few distinguished exceptions, the law teachers
and the law reviews have not yet begun to do for the administrative agencies what, for many years, they have been doing
for the courts....
Ought not the law schools recognize more fully that administrative agencies are creating, or should be creating, a body
of substantive law requiring constant critical analysis, almost as important as that produced by the courts? The day
when commissioners become concerned how their work in
defining the general standards laid down by the legislature
will be dissected in the law reviews, professors and students,
as judge's decisions applying decisions regularly are, will be
527
a good day for administrative adjudication.
Here lies the solution to the problems of the administrative process-ceaseless, unrelenting criticism and a concerted demand
from the legal world for a rational decision. In the area of foreign route award decisions, where there is no judicial review, the
adoption of the critical attitude is an imperative necessity. Today
the industry stands rudderless. With a sense of direction and
528
purpose it could achieve preeminence.

526. See Bluestone at 32.
527. Friendly at 1318.
528. Since this article was completed, the C.A.B. has once again blatantly
engaged in the very activity for which it has been most severely criticized. The
Board tentatively rejected the American-Eastern Merger by a three to two
vote. When American then withdrew its application, the Board dismissed the

case as moot and stated that it would issue no formal opinion on the merits of
the case. Thus, C.A.B. merger policies remain in a state of dark confusion and
the industry is left without guide lines. Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1963,

p. 22, col. 1.
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